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On February 24-25, 2006 an international workshop on “Regional and International 
Currency Arrangements” was held in Vienna. It was co-sponsored by the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank and the Bank of Greece, and jointly organized by Eduard Hochreiter and 
George Tavlas. Academic economists and researchers from central banks and 
international organizations presented and discussed current research, and reviewed and 
assessed the past experience with, and the future challenges of, international currency 
arrangements. A number of papers and the contributions by the discussants presented at 
this workshop are being made available to a broader audience in the Working Paper series 
of the Bank of Greece and simultaneously also in the Working Paper Series of the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The papers and the discussants’ comments will be 
published in the journal, International Economics and Economic Policy. Here we present 
the fourth of these papers. (The previous three were issued as Bank of Greece Working 
Papers No. 39 to 41.) In addition to the paper by Josef Christl, the Working Paper also 
contains the contribution of the discussant, Lars Jonung as well as the concluding remarks 
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This paper focuses on the requirements and features of a successful monetary union on the basis 
of the optimum currency area theory, the “logical roadmap” for integration as proposed by 
Balassa as well as the economic and institutional framework of the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). The analysis suggests that monetary union is contingent upon high 
economic integration and strong political commitment. However, political union is not an ex-ante 
requirement. Outside factors such as systemic shocks and globalization seem to speed up the 
pooling of sovereignty in the economic domain. A firm commitment to stability-oriented 
monetary and fiscal policies is a precondition for gaining credibility and trust within and outside 
a monetary union. Last, but not least, convergence criteria, fiscal rules and strong institutions are 
necessary to help ensure and monitor the participants’ compliance. However, the European 
experience is not a blueprint for regional integration that can be directly and entirely applied to 
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 Ever since the European Union (EU) decided to implement a monetary union, interest in 
regional currency arrangements and their theoretical foundation has surged. Up to this day, the 
basic theoretical foundation for this kind of analysis is the optimum currency area (OCA) 
literature. In the late 1990s, OCA theory was complemented by the finding that the criteria for 
successful monetary integration need not necessarily be fulfilled ex ante but that they can be 
fulfilled ex post owing to the workings of a monetary union. OCA criteria can thus be seen as 
endogenous by nature. This proposition suggests there are different possible paths to a monetary 
union.  
This paper will briefly highlight some aspects of the OCA literature, review the sequencing 
of economic integration, investigate the steps taken in Europe and draw some conclusion for the 
evolution and creation of currency arrangements in other regions of the world.  
 
2. OCAs and the role of institutions 
2.1 OCAs 
The classical theory of OCAs was developed by Mundell, McKinnon and Kenen as early as 
the 1960s. It defines an optimum currency area as a geographical region in which it is 
advantageous for member countries to use absolutely fixed exchange rates or have a common 
currency. The key factors determining whether countries belong to an OCA include the degree of 
economic diversification, openness, labor and capital mobility as well as wage and price 
flexibility. The idea behind the OCA theory is well known. If the participating countries do not 
meet OCA criteria, real adjustment in a fixed exchange rate regime takes a long time and can be 
very costly in the event a shock. In this case, a flexible exchange rate facilitates faster adaptation 
and minimizes costs. 
More recent works (e.g. Frankel, 1999) discuss another advantage of flexible exchange 
rates based on the “impossible trinity”, i.e. the impossibility of having a fixed exchange rate, 
capital mobility and monetary independence at the same time. In the presence of high capital 





1. If, however, national policymakers cannot make good use of the 
independence of monetary policy, it may be better to give it up and import stability from other 
countries. Indeed, monetary independence can be a curse rather than a blessing (Tavlas, 2003). 
Furthermore, other factors (e.g. central bank independence, administrative capacity, depth and 
liquidity of foreign exchange markets) can influence the tradeoff between monetary 
independence and exchange rate stability.  
The question whether OCA criteria are exogenous or endogenous has also been debated. 
Frankel and Rose (1998) argue that several criteria, such as the synchronization of business 
cycles or trade relationships, are endogenous. These criteria can be self-validating insofar as 
countries joining a currency union will in fact move closer together by increasing trade among 
them and business cycle correlations. Indeed, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) has for 
a long time argued that Austria’s hard currency peg to the Deutsche mark (which had been 
pursued for two decades prior to the start of EMU) was a showcase of a currency peg that created 
the conditions for its own credibility and sustainability over time: when Austria opted for an 
exchange rate peg in 1974, the two countries did not yet meet OCA requirements. The Austrian 
schilling’s appreciation relative to the Deutsche mark between 1979 and 1981 served as a signal, 
thus increasing the credibility of the hard currency regime. This “hard-currency-option” triggered 
off adjustment processes which ultimately made Austria part of an OCA with Germany 
(Hochreiter and Winckler, 1995). In our own terminology we coined the term “structural whip” 
for this mechanism, arguing that a fixed exchange rate policy creates strong incentives for 
structural reforms which make the exchange rate peg beneficial and sustainable. For a recently 
published summary of the reasoning behind the hard currency policy, see Gnan et al (2005). 
There are several ways how a country’s membership in a monetary union may contribute to 
the ex-post fulfillment of OCA criteria:  
(1) it can stimulate trade, which  
(2) can affect a member’s trade and production patterns by making it less vulnerable to industry-
specific shocks (symmetry of shocks and synchronization of outputs);  
(3) increased competition can contribute to making product and labor markets more flexible, and  
                                                 
1 Lipschitz et al. (2005) argue that in open catching-up economies, which are well-endowed with labor but lack 




(4) membership in a monetary union will stimulate the integration of capital markets, which may 
increase the abilities for absorbance and risk sharing in the event of a shock.  
 
3. European experiences 
Monetary arrangements are closely connected to the degree of economic and political 
regional integration. According to Balassa’s famous “logical roadmap” for integration (Balassa, 
1962), countries first create a free trade area. In a next step, they introduce a common external 
tariff, thus de facto creating a customs union. In a third step, they further improve efficiencies by 
creating an internal market. And finally, to make full use of the benefits of the internal market, 
the member countries introduce a common currency to achieve a further deepening of the 
integration process. This, in turn, generates incentives for further political integration. While 
Balassa’s roadmap is plausible and, to a certain extent, reflects the European experience, it is 
certainly impossible to derive straightforward “laws” governing regional integration in the global 
political economy.  
In Europe, political cooperation and exchange rate stability have been regarded as key 
elements in preventing beggar-thy-neighbor policies through competitive devaluations, and thus 
as preconditions for sustainable trade integration. This is why the EU Member States furthered 
political cooperation, institution building, regional integration and exchange rate stability before 
introducing capital mobility and monetary union. It can also be argued that the objective of the 
European regional integration process encompassed more than just creating a common market. 
The political will was underpinned by an ambitious vision which included, from the very start, 
the establishment of a monetary union and eventually of a kind of “United States of Europe” in 
order to achieve a permanent reconciliation of the continent after centuries of war.  
The move towards monetary union in Europe, which was driven by political as well as 
economic considerations, involved several steps. The final moves before the adoption of the euro 
in 1999 were made in a relatively short period of time: the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, 
the exchange rate mechanism ERM I was put in place in 1979, capital flows were fully 
liberalized by 1990, the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1991 and the establishment of the 




The debate on macroeconomic policymaking in general, and on the creation of a monetary 
union in particular, was stimulated by the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System and, between 
1979 and 1987, by the frequent and very significant realignments in the newly created ERM I. In 
June 1988, an important decision was taken with regard to establishing the single market: to 
remove all exchange controls impeding the movement of capital by the mid-1990s. This decision 
made it possible for capital to move across borders without restrictions and to react to divergent 
economic performances. As a result, central banks lost much of their ability to control exchange 
rates, which could possibly have amplified exchange rate volatility and hence posed a serious 
threat to the functioning of the internal market. In this crucial situation, the Delors Report (which 
was adopted by the European Council in June 1989) forged a common understanding of 
macroeconomic policymaking and the creation of a monetary union. This process resulted in the 
Maastricht Treaty of December 1991 – a milestone on the road toward European integration. 
In the political arena, the agreement to establish EMU was attributable to two reasons: (1) 
the firm commitment of several EU member states to the ongoing process of European 
integration, mainly driven by France and Germany (Maes, 2002), and (2) the shared vision of a 
European economic power that has overcome “Eurosclerosis” and is able to strengthen its 
position in the global economy.  
There were, however, also other reasons for the establishment of EMU: the process of 
integration had acquired a life and a history of its own over some 50 years, individual 
governments were bound by the commitments made by their predecessors and none of the 
member states wished to be left behind as the EU embarked on one of the most consequential 
institutional innovations in its history. Another factor was the realization that, even though the 
continued commitment to EMU and the implementation of policies to achieve the EMU criteria 
were at times costly, these efforts would serve national interests in the end. This is what 
distinguishes the European experience from other regional integration processes observed today.  
No matter whether the OCA criteria were fulfilled in a strict sense from the start of EMU – 
the stakeholders involved expected the participating countries to achieve a sufficient degree of 
convergence in the process. Especially in the second half of the 1990s, the prospect of EMU  
considerably accelerated the convergence process. Even though the difference in real 




strong institutional framework geared to monetary and fiscal stability, as well as the four 
freedoms within the single market.  
Notwithstanding the existence of several masterplans with predefined deadlines (e.g. for the 
single market or EMU), the process of European integration can probably be better described as 
“muddling through” or – to use a more positive metaphor – an evolutionary process which 
included serious and lingering differences up until the final outcome. Yet, it follows from (neo-) 
functionalist theory that each integration step makes the next one more likely. Hence, European 
integration can be described as a dynamic process that has never been predetermined and in 
which unplanned moves become possible when the occasion arises. It appears that, contrary to 
opportunities, time has not always been of essence. 
 
3.1 Requirements and long-run sustainability  
The Maastricht Treaty specifies the conditions EU Member States have to fulfill in order to 
be eligible for joining EMU. These requirements include the well-known macroeconomic 
convergence criteria and legal requirements such as central bank independence. These criteria 
were a driving force for nominal convergence and helped ensure and monitor compliance, as 
governments showed their willingness to follow stability-oriented policies without imposing 
costs on other members.  
The experience with the ERM I showed that the road toward a common currency is paved 
with difficulties. ERM I made painfully clear that the internal adaptability of some participating 
economies was insufficient and therefore not credible for a smooth working of the peg. The 
periodic crises and the recurring need for realignments within the ERM demonstrated that a 
currency union is only sustainable if (1) the economic policies of its member countries are 
oriented toward promoting competitiveness and growth and (2) if they are coordinated at least to 
the extent that they are not contradictory, thus leading to economic convergence rather than 
divergence in the long run.  
As McCallum already noted in 1995, a common currency requires a firmer and lasting 
commitment than other forms of hard pegs given that policy consistency and credibility have to 





3.2. The role of institutions 
The idea that economic institutions affect a society’s functioning and prosperity is not new 
at all. As a matter of fact, one of the first scholars to promote it was nobody else than Adam 
Smith. He accurately identified the following key drivers of national prosperity: capital 
accumulation, free trade and efficient markets, personal initiative, an appropriate role for 
government and a good institutional infrastructure (Smith, 1776). The pioneering fundamentals in 
the modern empirical literature were laid by Nobel laureate Douglas North, who maintained that 
well-functioning institutions are the decisive determinant of an economy’s long-run performance 
(North, 1990).  
In a monetary union as complex as EMU, supranational institutions, such as the European 
Council, the European Parliament, the European Commission and the ECB are of central 
importance in addition to the national institutions. The actual performance of EMU hinges upon 
the principles and political objectives of the treaties on which EMU is founded and on the design 
of the supranational institutions which are entrusted with implementing, monitoring, interpreting 
and further developing this body of rules.  
In this context, it is important to point out that the incentive structure of national 
macroeconomic policymaking and structural reforms in EMU are somewhat different from the 
pre-EMU period. Being a member of the EU, but not yet part of the euro area, the probably 
greater differentiation by financial markets, as the exchange rate risk is still real, and the 
sustainable fulfillment of the convergence criteria as a precondition for joining EMU, have 
proven to be effective instruments to promote economic reforms, sound macroeconomic policy 
making and thus nominal and real economic convergence. These rather direct incentive 
mechanisms outside EMU transform once a country has joined the euro area. Hence, EMU 
members need to comply with more stringent rules, most notably the Stability and Growth Pact, 
which becomes an even more powerful inmstrument in EMU. In addition, a rather insidious 
economic process is inherent in every monetary union, as a result of which badly designed 
policies lead to a loss of competitiveness. This is a development which is costly to reverse. 
Actually, such an economic divergence within EMU would run counter to the idea that the OCA 




Hence, the participating member states and policymakers in EMU have to have an even 
higher level of awareness, responsibility and self-discipline when it comes to structural and 
macroeconomic policymaking. In this respect, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, the 
Employment Guidelines, and the Lisbon National Reform Programs, along with the associated 
surveillance and peer pressure mechanisms, are essential institutional instruments.   
 
3.3 Fiscal rules 
Fiscal rules are  another very important factor for the long-run sustainability of a monetary 
union (Christl, 2003; Hochreiter et al, 2002). Since fiscal policies remain the responsibility of 
national governments, fiscal rules are based on political economy considerations and are intended 
to restrict the deficit bias of national governments. Public expenditure is often financed by issuing 
debt owing to inter-temporal redistribution considerations, as this type of financing shifts fiscal 
burdens from the present to the future.  
Fiscal rules are also important because membership in a monetary union can give rise to 
moral hazard and free-rider problems (Bruni, 2004). Moral hazard occurs when a member 
country expects to be bailed out by the others when it is faced with unsustainable debt levels. 
Free-riding, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which the adverse impact of fiscal laxity is 
not entirely borne by those national authorities which embark on fiscal expansion, but driving up 
the union-wide interest rate. In addition, free-riding might induce others to relax their fiscal 
discipline, too, and weaken EU fiscal rules in general. 
In addition to making monetary policymaking more complicate owing to demand effects on 
prices, excessive deficits also entail significant medium- and long-run costs (e.g. higher real 
interest rates and tax burdens). Moreover, if the monetary authorities in a currency union are not 
sufficiently independent, political pressure may be exerted upon the central bank to monetize 
government debt. The resulting loss in central bank credibility can drive up inflation expectations 
and steady-state inflation. 
It appears that financial market agents apply a non-linear risk function to government debt 
and/or simply do not believe that the no-bail-out clause is irrevocable (Treaty establishing the 
European Community, Art. 103). Hence, interest rate spreads are only a minor punishment for 




this is no reason for complacency, as a sudden change in the financial market’s assessment may 
cause abrupt and strong corrections in the financial markets at some point in time. Once fiscal 
imbalances have built up, higher interest rates can quickly trigger a vicious circle of growing debt 
and increasing interest rates.  
Finally, fiscal rules are important because they provide some type of agreed benchmark. 
Policymakers have to justify their fiscal stance in relation to the benchmark in international 
bodies (e.g. the Eurogroup and the ECOFIN in the EU), national bodies (e.g. parliaments) and the 
public at large.  
For all these reasons, fiscal rules are a necessary feature in a credible, sustainable and 
successful monetary union. Watering down the Stability and Growth Pact would not at all be 
helpful in this respect.  
 
3.4 Benefits and costs 
Eliminating transaction costs and exchange rate risks increases economic growth by 
reducing real interest rates and stimulating the international division of labor and capital, which 
in turn unlocks efficiency gains. Some of the main benefits of monetary union so far can be 
summarized as follows: 
1)  reduced transaction costs,  
2)  increased price transparency and, therefore, increased cross-border competition, 
3)  immediately integrated EMU money markets, 
4)  increased liquidity und product structure of European bond markets, 
5)  sped-up consolidation in the European financial sector, 
6)  slowly but permanently increased international role of the euro as an transaction and 
reserve currency, 
7)  much higher potential of shock absorption, as unwarranted exchange rate fluctuations in 
response to an outside shock (such as the tragic events of September 11, 2001) are not 
possible any longer, 




9)  high degree of price stability in all member countries and 
10) existence of a surveillance system for public debt and fiscal deficits.  
Empirical studies (e.g. Faruqee, 2003) indicate that the establishment of EMU has led to an 
increase in trade among its members by 10% since 1999. Faruqee also showed that the associated 
dynamic growth effects have been rising over time and are still increasing, although the gains are 
not evenly distributed. Trade creation is not necessarily guaranteed: structural policies such as 
facilitating sectoral reallocation and market entry are needed to help realize the full potential 
arising from monetary union. Overall, Rose (2000) concluded that a one-percent increase in trade 
between the countries of a currency union leads to an increase of per-capita income by 0.3 
percent. 
But EMU has also incurred indirect costs, the most important of which are related to a 
serious loss of price competitiveness of the export industries in some countries (especially in Italy 
and Spain). Obviously, fiscal laxity has also increased, mainly in some of the larger countries. 
Moreover, the political commitment to Europe and to the common currency, which is an 
important condition for the long-run sustainability of the monetary union, has suffered in recent 
years. 
There is some evidence that, for small countries, the benefits of EMU outweigh its costs by 
a relatively large margin, mainly because losing the exchange-rate instrument is not connected to 
significant costs. Small countries (such as Belgium or Austria) are generally more open and more 
exposed to the effects of globalization and international competition. This is why they tended to 
be more diligent in undertaking ambitious structural reforms. By contrast, larger countries are 
often more concerned about the domestic effects of reforms and are thus more reluctant to 
proceed with their implementation. However, also these countries have eventually made the 
experience that relying on the domestic economy alone is a short-sighted approach. Structural 
rigidities combined with the lack of autonomous monetary policy makes adjustment to 
asymmetric shocks a painful and tedious process.  
Furthermore, the net benefits of monetary union are not the same for all members. In the 
long run, especially EMU members at the periphery, which do not completely fulfill the OCA 
criteria,  cannot be expected to benefit from EMU to the same extent as the states of the U.S. 




4. Closer monetary integration in other regions? 
4.1 Central and Eastern European countries 
The first of the new EU Member States from Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) are expected to join the euro area in 2007. Their experience with monetary integration 
may, however, be only partially applicable to other parts of the world, given their geographic 
proximity, their close historical and economic ties with Western Europe as well as broader 
geopolitical considerations. Some aspects may still be of relevance. 
The prospect of EU membership stimulated the adjustment of economic policies in the 
CEECs as well as an overhaul of institutions. Other reasons for the obvious economic success in 
this part of Europe include the early liberalization of trade, the proper sequencing of 
macroeconomic stabilization measures, the liberalization of capital flows and serious structural 
reforms. Given the considerable differences in nominal and real convergence with the euro area 
in some of the new Member States, however, there is still some way to go before they can join 
the euro area. In order to comply with EMU requirements, they need to undertake further reforms 
and implement sound fiscal policies. 
 
4.2 Asia, Latin America and the Middle East 
According to the Balassa sequencing, stronger regional integration has two consequences: 
First, when a free trade area becomes a single market, it is important to maintain intra-regional 
exchange rate stability in order to reap the full benefits from such a move. Second, a converging 
stability orientation of monetary policies in the countries involved promotes exchange rate 
stability.  
The conditions for establishing EMU in Europe were in several respects different from the 
current situation in Asia and Latin America 
In Asia and in Latin America it is difficult to define homogenous regions, as they tend to be 
pluralistic and overlapping. Furthermore, there are no central bodies in place to design and 
promote the integration process, such as the European Commission and the Council of the EU, 




of the Balassa sequencing. The Chiang Mai Initiative can be seen as just a further step toward a 
higher level of institutional regional integration. 
In Asia and Latin America, the political and economic regimes as well as the levels of 
nominal and real convergence are more heterogeneous than in Europe. Therefore, the benefits of 
monetary integration would be lower and the associated costs and risks would be higher on both 
continents. 
In the Middle East, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is preparing a monetary union 
between Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Following 
the creation of a free trade area and a customs union, the completion of a common market is 
envisaged for 2007, and the single currency should be introduced by 2010. While monetary 
integration is remarkably advanced in these countries owing to a long-standing USD peg of the 
currencies involved, fiscal convergence remains a challenge, and structural convergence might 
actually diminish as a result of the ongoing process of diversification from oil and gas extraction 
industry in the GCC economies (Sturm and Siegfried, 2005).  
 
4.3 Stability-oriented macro-policies as an alternative? 
For the reasons mentioned earlier, establishing a currency union in the near future is neither 
desirable nor realistic for many countries or regions of the world. Still, relatively stable exchange 
rates in line with economic fundamentals, which stimulate world trade and the international 
division of labor, support a prosperous development of the world economy. Stability-oriented 
monetary and fiscal policies are necessary preconditions in this context.  
Traditional monetary policy frameworks designed to achieve low inflation and sustainable 
growth rested upon intermediate variables such as monetary aggregates to anchor expectations. 
This concept is often not suitable for emerging market economies (EMEs) mainly because of 
instable money demand functions. Experience in some EMEs has shown that an explicit inflation 
target can provide a credible anchor for inflation expectations. Thus, inflation targeting
2 may be a 
                                                 
2 Monetary targeting is an attempt to stabilize the inflation rate around the target value, presupposing a 
stable empirical relationship of the monetary target to the inflation rate and its relationship to the 




successful strategy for larger EMEs to foster the desired macroeconomic stability, while at the 
same time remaining flexible enough to cope with external shocks. Price stability and sound 
fiscal policy are clearly a precondition for further monetary integration in the future. 
The inflation-targeting experience of Brazil and Chile shows that it is indeed possible for a 
country to make progress in reducing inflation and gain credibility. Another benefit, as pointed 
out by Bernanke et al. (1999), is that an inflation-targeting framework is not based on an 
automatic Friedman-type rule but rests on constrained discretion: Chile and Brazil, for example, 
proceeded gradually and flexibly in implementing inflation targeting, which helped reduce 
inflation without incurring substantial output costs. Therefore, a case can be made for adopting an 
inflation targeting policy framework, especially in larger EMEs, since it forces policymakers to 
step up reform, enhance transparency and improve the fiscal stance, while promoting 
convergence to (by international standards) low levels of inflation.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The successful completion of EMU and the introduction of the euro have substantially 
increased the general interest in regional integration and especially in regional monetary 
arrangements. The experience with monetary integration in Europe so far suggests that  
•  monetary union is contingent upon a high level of economic integration and a firm 
political commitment; 
•  political union is not at all an ex-ante requirement;  
•  outside factors, such as systemic shocks and globalization, seem to speed up the pooling 
of sovereignty in the economic domain; 
•  a clear stability orientation in the monetary and fiscal field is a precondition for gaining 
credibility and trust within and outside a monetary union;  
                                                                                                                                                              
emerging markets. Monetary policy is constrained in a system with an exchange rate rule, so that it cannot 
react to domestic or external shocks. In developing countries/EMEs the exchange rate itself can be a 





•  convergence criteria, fiscal rules and strong institutions are necessary to ensure and 
monitor compliance. 
However, the EU experience is not a blueprint for regional integration that can be directly 
and entirely applied to other regions. Unreflective comparison will most likely lead us into the 
dangerous trap of Eurocentrism. 
Although a number of studies argue that OCA criteria are at least to a certain extent 
endogenous, I strongly believe that the Balassa sequencing provides us with a meaningful pattern 
of how to achieve a higher level of regional integration. Successfully anchoring inflation 
expectations in the field of monetary policy and sound fiscal policies are key aspects of such a 
development. If all these preconditions are fulfilled, currency unions may, at some point in the 
future, also be an option in the Gulf region, in Asia, Latin America or another region of the 
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The paper by Josef Christl covers a large number of monetary policy issues in a limited 
space. He deals with the OCA literature, the European experience of monetary unification, the 
Maastricht treaty, fiscal rules, the benefits of the euro, the monetary situation of Eastern Europe, 
Asia and Latin America and the rise of inflation targeting as an alternative to monetary unions. 
The purpose of his panorama is to draw lessons from the European experience of monetary 
unification for the rest of the world.  
He summarizes these lessons in four points: 
1. Monetary unification rests on economic and political integration 
2. Political union is not required in advance of monetary unification 
3. There is an ongoing international trend towards pooling of economic sovereignty 
4. Convergence criteria and fiscal rules are necessary for successful monetary unification 
These conclusions are roughly in line with the conventional wisdom today. I will not 
challenge this body of mainstream thinking. Instead, I would like to add to Christl’s discussion by 
bringing in four additional aspects that I feel deserve attention. 
1. The political economy of monetary unification 
2. The endogeneity of monetary unions 
3. Fiscal rules and fiscal independence 
4. ‘Muddling through’ or policy-learning 
 
1. The political economy of monetary unification.  
Christl’s discussion is based on the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA). The OCA 
approach is based upon a trade-off between efficiency and stabilization. This is the standard tool 




traditionally the nation state. Nation states make decisions to join or to abstain from joining 
monetary unions.  
Of course, this approach is a simplification of real world conditions. In modern 
democracies, the decision to join or not to join a monetary union is made in the political sphere, 
ultimately by the public in their capacities of voters. Voters commonly ask: what is in it for me? 
They focus on the effects of any policy proposal on the distribution of income and wealth. This 
holds for monetary unification as well.  
Thus, to get a better understanding of the outlook for monetary unification outside Europe 
we should look at the distributive issues involved in joining a monetary union. These issues were 
clearly brought out in the election that took place in Sweden on Sunday September 14, 2000. 
That day Swedish voters went to the polls to answer this question: “Do you think that Sweden 
should introduce the euro as its official currency?’ 
The Swedish referendum in September 2003 on adopting the euro or keeping the domestic 
currency, the krona, represents a unique opportunity to examine the perceptions of the different 
groups in society of the benefits and costs of monetary unification. The voters chose between the 
two polar cases of exchange rate regimes (the corner solutions): either a freely floating exchange 
rate combined with inflation targeting or membership in a monetary union, the euro area.
1 
How did the voters cast their votes? Let us first assume that voters act in their self-interest 
and are well-informed – that they calculate the respective costs and benefits of the common 
currency and the national currency. 
The question underlying differences in voting patterns among voters is: Who will benefit 
and who will lose from membership in a monetary union? Thus, distributional issues immediately 
take centre stage. The OCA approach provides a number of testable hypotheses. Voters in the 
tradable sector or in other sectors exposed to the international economy could be expected to be 
more in favour of the euro than voters in the non-tradable sector or other sectors sheltered from 
international influences. Voters with no or little exposure to the international economy, who 
depend primarily on domestic economic and political developments, are likely to prefer national 
policy autonomy. Such independence gives them better insurance against domestic and 
international disturbances, both symmetric and asymmetric, than an irrevocably fixed rate. Voters 
                                                 




who depend on the public sector (the welfare state) could be expected to favour the krona, as euro 
membership is viewed as a threat to a large public sector. 
High income earners and well educated voters would be expected to vote yes to the euro as 
they have insurance through the private sector. Low income voters would be expected to vote no 
as their insurance and protection against shocks comes primarily from the public sector. Women 
tend to prefer public sector solutions; hence, more women than men could be expected to vote 
against the euro. 
The outcome of the Swedish referendum confirms these predictions of the OCA approach. 
However, political attitudes and ideology influenced voters as well. The outcomes of the various 
referenda on membership in the European Union in other European countries are also consistent 
with these predictions. Consequently, we should expect similar patterns to hold for the rest of the 
world. Thus, domestic political conditions are likely to be important determinants of membership 
in any future monetary union.  
 
2. The endogeneity of monetary unions.  
Christl gives considerable credence to the idea that monetary union performance is 
endogenous. In other words, the longer you are a member of a club, the better you will fit into it. 
There is considerable evidence that such mechanisms are at work. However, today we also notice 
a number of tendencies that challenge this interpretation in the euro area.  
First of all, “Maastricht fatigue” on the budgetary side is clearly evident in several 
countries. Fiscal discipline has been difficult to maintain once countries have entered the euro 
area. This fatigue contributed to the modifications of the initial Stability and Growth Pact.  
We also see real interest rate differentials arising across the euro area. There is no 
consensus regarding the role of these developments. Some economists argue that they simply 
reflect the workings of a monetary union, and thus should not be viewed as a source of tension. 
Others argue that they demonstrate that a common nominal interest rate across the euro area will 
foster different growth rates across the unions and thus strengthen imbalances.  
The success of the common currency depends on the flexibility of the real economy of the 
euro area. For this reason economic reforms are important to make the euro area move towards an 




the stock market bust in 2000-2001, political resistance towards economic reforms has been 
strong. Interest groups across EU have mobilized the public and politicians against productivity-
enhancing reforms, thus preventing EU from reaping the full advantages of a common currency.  
There is presently a risk that the euro is turning into a scapegoat for the economic problems 
facing Europe. In this blame-game, some politicians may be tempted to question euro-
membership instead of tackling the domestic roots of slow growth and high unemployment. This 
type of behaviour has a long tradition in history. It is not the first time that international 
cooperation has been exploited for domestic purposes by populist forces.  
Christl shows that Austria created the necessary domestic fiscal and monetary discipline 
prior to entry into the euro-area by using the “structural whip”. This whip worked successfully in 
Austria before euro-membership. However, the challenge is to maintain a well-functioning whip 
now that Austria is inside the monetary union. This holds not only for Austria, but for all 
members of the euro area.  
 
3. Fiscal rules and fiscal independence.  
Christl argues forcefully for the use of fiscal rules. However, experience has proved that 
such rules are difficult to enforce, since policy-makers are innovative and tend to develop 
techniques to circumvent any straitjacket constructed to rein them in.  
Much suggests that fiscal rules should be complemented by other techniques to foster fiscal 
performance. Fiscal governance may be improved through reforms of the institutions involved in 
the framing of fiscal measures. Let me give some examples. Within the EU, statistical offices 
may be more independent from the executive power. In a similar way, independent forecasting 
authorities, such as exist in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, can be set up in countries 
where the ministry of finance has systematically biased its forecasts concerning future growth 
and thus ex post created a budget deficit bias.
2 Independent budgetary offices may also be part of 
an institutional reform of fiscal policy-making.  
                                                 




The idea of independent fiscal bodies that are not under the immediate control of the 
ministry of finance and the government is an attractive one, regardless of the specific exchange 
rate arrangement adopted. It is an idea worth exporting from Europe to the rest of the world. 
4. Muddling through or policy-learning.  
Christl views Europe and the euro area as involved in a process of muddling through. I 
would like to suggest a more positive interpretation. The euro area is going through a learning 
process. As Christl stresses, European monetary unification is not following a master plan. 
Instead Europe is adjusting to new disturbances and new challenges as they emerge while at the 
same time learning about the new economic and political landscape.  
The euro is a large full-scale experiment – unique in monetary and economic history. As 
long as there is a learning process going on, new lessons will be learnt and thus improvements 
can be made. This flexibility is important to ensure the sustainability of the monetary unification 
process.
3 This message should be conveyed to the rest of the world. 
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  We began with discussions of what has been, to date, a surprisingly successful 
monetary union - - EMU - - though it has not been without problems. In his paper, Otmar 
Issing assessed the applicability of optimum-currency-area analysis to the euro zone context. 
He noted that euro area countries do not perform well relative to the US in terms of the OCA 
criteria. This finding - - that the OCA area criteria do not support the formation of a currency 
block - - was a general conclusion of the workshop. It also applied to Latin America, North 
America, and Asia. Issing also noted, however, that in light of the endogeneity of the OCA 
criteria, a large part of the cost of monetary union appears to be early on, but the benefits 
appear gradually. In view of the implications of the OCA criteria for EMU, why did European 
countries nevertheless proceed with EMU? Issing cited the open economy trilemma in the 
European context. With the move to a single market, the trilemma became a dilemma. Either 
fix the exchange rate and lose monetary policy independence or pursue an independent 
monetary policy and float. Given historical factors, however, the second option was not 
feasible. Moreover, in view of the bipolar hypothesis stabilizing the exchange rate meant 
giving up national currencies and adopting a hard fix. 
  Josef Christl reminded us that Europe went through a Balassa sequencing (Free Trade 
Area – common external tariff – customs union) that took half a century before arriving at 
EMU. He underlined the unequal distribution of benefits within EMU, with smaller countries 
having lower costs than larger ones and core countries than the periphery. Christl also stressed 
the political dimension of the monetary integration process, a view that was echoed by others 
during the conference. An important insight for other regions was that they were more  
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heterogeneous than Europe and were lacking a strong region-minded center. Central and 
eastern European countries were in a special position as the prospects for EU-membership and 
the euro provided an important driving force for structural adjustment, institution building and 
political support. Thus, Europe does not constitute a blueprint for other regions. 
  How relevant is EMU for other regions? In his discussion of North America Sven 
Arndt noted that North America differs from Europe in terms of (1) the diversity in size of the 
economies, (2) diversity of economic development, and (3) the relative importance of trade. 
The European context suggests the need for deeper real sector integration, a point also 
emphasized by Issing in terms of the role played by the European single market. Still, Arndt 
sees some emerging signs for the conditions of an OCA in North America because of the 
increase of network-based trade. This increase is leading to a decline in the buffer role of 
floating rates. Nevertheless, a monetary union in North America appears to be some distance 
in the future based on what Arndt describes as the tendency of the Bank of Canada to pursue 
an independent monetary policy though keeping an eye on the exchange rate, while political 
conditions within Mexico for a permanent fix are not yet in place.  
  Moving south, Sebastian Edwards does not see the feasibility of a monetary union in 
South America. For one thing, his literature review shows conclusively that the countries in 
the region do not satisfy the OCA criteria either as a group or as subgroups. For another thing, 
his empirical analysis leads to the finding that, for a large panel of countries, currency unions 
were associated with a higher frequency of sudden stops of capital flows and current account 
reversals. This finding is especially relevant in the Latin American context since many of the 
countries in the region have traditionally been subject to large fluctuations in capital account 
crises. Moreover, in a separate panel estimation Edwards found that external shocks had a 
greater negative impact on GDP growth for countries belonging to a currency union.  
  What about Asia? Hans Genberg sees some possibility of a move toward greater 
monetary integration, but such integration, he believes, should not follow the European model 
in which the EMS and the lifting of capital controls eventuated in an exchange rate crisis. 
Instead, Genberg presented an evolutionary proposal. As financial markets in the region 
become more fully integrated over time and if inflation-targeting frameworks produce 
inflation objectives that are sufficiently similar, interest rates are likely to be more highly-
correlated. Once interest rates converge monetary union can proceed. The advantages of this 
approach are that it is compatible with increasing financial integration, it allows central banks 
to pursue similar objectives in their self interest and it is flexible in the sense of which  
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countries decide to participate. He foresees three satellite currency blocks comprised of the 
renminbi, the won and the yen. The corresponding central banks would gear monetary 
policies toward internal stability objectives. Genberg also presents a second scenario in which 
the smaller countries in the region move to a common currency with a common central bank.   
  What about exchange rate management? Both John Williamson and Richard Cooper 
presented proposals for greater monetary integration among major currencies. A common 
point of departure for both authors is that flexible exchange rates, while potentially useful as 
shock absorbers have also been a source of misalignment, creating uncertainty for trade and 
capital formation. Indeed, Williamson questioned whether in an era of price stability, in which 
inflation differentials among major currencies are small, whether swings in exchange rates of 
50 per cent in short periods of time are reasonable. He proposes a reference rate system, a 
main feature of which is an obligation not to intervene in a way that pushes the market rate 
away from the reference rate, while intervention is allowed to push the rate toward the 
reference rate. A main benefit of this proposal is that it would provide more focused 
surveillance since the reference rate would have to be endorsed by the international 
community. Indeed, at a time of increased reflection about the role of the IMF, Williamson’s 
proposal would provide needed focus for the role of the Fund, because under the proposal the 
Fund’s staff would be in charge of monitoring compliance with reference rates.  
  Richard Cooper proposes a vision for the second or third decade of the 21
st century. In 
particular his proposal involves a common currency for the US, the EU, and Japan. The 
implementation of his proposal involves a transition period involving the targeting of 
exchange rates within 10 per cent bands, to be narrowed over time, based on purchasing 
power parity with regard to wholesale prices à la McKinnon. Europe, Japan and the US are 
deemed suitable candidates because asymmetric shocks are likely to diminish in the light of 
the size and diversification of the particular economies while fiscal policy would deal with the 
shocks that do occur. Correspondingly, with the continued rise in international financial 
transactions relative to the rise in international trade in goods and services expected to 
continue in the future, financial factors will dominate exchange rate determination, rendering 
swings in exchange rates subject to even greater misalignment than at present. Cooper 
presents blueprints of his vision including governance and accountability. 
  Michael Bordo and Harold James provide a historical context for their assessment 
about the prospects of a world currency in the future. They note that the European context is 
not very relevant as EMU was driven by a political agenda. History shows, they argue, that  
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political integration is necessary for successful monetary integration. In the 19
th century, the 
costs of forming a monetary union were relatively small because countries were in a better 
position than today to place restrictions on sovereignty. Moreover, the real cost of giving up 
an independent monetary policy and joining a currency union was small since the gold 
standard already imposed a common monetary policy. Monetary unions they believe are 
becoming less attractive for several reasons. First, with the advance of democracy, 
sovereignty is becoming more important. Second, transaction costs of exchanging currencies 
are declining. Third, monetary policy is better understood. For example, central bank 
independence has been accompanied by the discipline imposed by inflation targeting. Fourth, 
the specific European context is not applicable elsewhere. For example, Asia does not have 
two equal powers the likes of France and Germany. For these reasons, they argue, proposals 
for a world currency fail to address the issue of who is making policy and in whose interest it 
is being made. 
  In a series of influential papers, Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and Peter 
Garber (DFG) have argued that the present international monetary arrangements constitute a 
new Bretton Woods system under which the Asian economies peg their currencies to the 
dollar. According to DFG, by maintaining pegged, undervalued real exchange rates Asian 
economies have promoted manufactured exports and, therefore, real growth. Reserve 
accumulation by Asian central banks allows the US to rely on domestic demand to drive its 
growth and run large current account deficits. In their paper for the workshop, DFG present a 
portfolio balance analysis of the dynamics of the new Bretton Woods system. The analysis 
leads to the inference that real interest rates in the US and Europe will remain low relative to 
historical norms for an extended period of time as Asian countries continue to intervene, 
accumulating US dollars, in foreign exchange markets. Real interest rates in the US and 
Europe will converge slowly toward more normal rates during an adjustment interval, a 
feature of which has the US absorbing a disproportionate share of world savings. In real 
terms, while the dollar and other floating currencies will eventually have to depreciate relative 
to pegged currencies, most of the adjustment in the US trade account will result from a 
response of US absorption to increases in real interest rates.  
  Nouriel Roubini takes issue with the DFG thesis. In particular, he argues that the new 
Bretton Woods system is fundamentally different from the original Bretton Woods regime. 
The new system is unstable and fragile and will unravel in the next few years and not over a 
period of a decade or longer as posited by DFG. Roubini points out that the structure of the  
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new regime has undergone changes in the past few years that contribute to its fragility. 
Whereas in the earlier years of the new regime US dollar reserves were primarily accumulated 
by Asian economies running current account surpluses, in the past few years those surpluses 
have been shrinking partly because of the effects of oil price increases. In the past year or so, 
the large US current account deficits have been partly sustained by pegged exchange rates and 
reserve accumulations by oil exporting countries, a situation which Roubini believes is not 
sustainable. Consequently, the new Bretton Woods system could unravel in the next few years 
with the dollar falling sharply, the consequences of which would be a disorderly rebalancing 
of the global economy  
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